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Defendant/Appellant Glen C. Pickett ("Pickett"), by and through counsel, hereby
objects to Plaintiff7Appellees', Daniel Armstrong's, Jared Armstrong's and Taylor
Armstrong's (hereinafter collectively referred to as "the Armstrongs") Statement of Facts
and submit their Reply Brief as set forth below.
OBJECTION TO THE ARMSTRONGS' STATEMENT OF FACTS
While the Heading in the Armstrongs' Brief states that it contains relevant facts with
citations to the record, several of the facts set forth therein are irrelevant to the issues on
appeal and appear to be inserted for inflammatory purposes. Furthermore, several of the
facts included in the Armstrongs' Brief simply restate the trial court's factual findings that
are on appeal for lack of evidentiary support. Those facts should not be given any weight by
this Court.
I.

THE ARMSTRONGS' ARGUMENT REGARDING THE STANDARD
OF REVIEW FOR EVIDENTIARY RULINGS FAILED TO ADDRESS
ANY OF THE FACTUAL ISSUES IN THIS CASE

In their first point of argument, the Armstrongs correctly identify the standard of
review used to evaluate a trial court's evidentiary rulings and factual findings and the impact
of harmless errors. The Armstrongs, however, fail to identify any particular factual finding,
or evidentiary ruling that resulted in harmless error. While Point I of the Armstrongs'
Brief may be a fair statement regarding the rule of harmless error, they have failed to apply
the rule to the case at hand. Since Pickett's counsel and this Court are left to guess which
errors the Armstrongs claim may be harmless, or the reasons that they may be harmless, the
Armstrongs' first argument cannot be responded to and should be ignored.
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H.

PICKETT ADEQUATELY PRESERVED THE ISSUES THAT
NEEDED TO BE PRESERVED FOR APPEAL

Point II of the Armstrongs' argument contends that Pickett failed to raise several of
the issues on appeal below. The only two issues that had to be raised below to preserve
them for appeal, however, were: (1) whether Daniel Armstrong had standing to sue for
damage to property he did not own; and (2) whether the PIP threshold requirement set forth
in Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-309(l) had to be met before the Armstrongs, individually,
could pursue claims for general damages.1 The other issues on appeal are factual issues
which can be raised at any time in this case because the trial court was the fact finder.
A.

Pickett Was Not Required to Raise His Objections to the Trial
Court's Factual Findings in Order to Appeal Them

The Armstrongs' Brief claims that Pickett cannot challenge the Proposed Findings
of Fact and Conclusions of Law, (R. 567), on appeal because his objection below does not
meet the standard set forth in Hart v. Salt Lake County Comm'n, 945 P.2d 125, 129 (Utah
Ct. App. 1997) (holding issues must be brought to a level of consciousness before the trial
court to afford it an opportunity to make a ruling). Pickett's challenges to the trial court's
factual findings in this case, however, are governed by Utah R. Civ. P. 52(b). It states in
part:
When findings of fact are made in actions tried by the court without a jury,
the question of the sufficiency of the evidence to support the findings may
thereafter be raised whether or not the party raising the question has made in
the district court an objection to such findings or has made either a motion to
amend them, a motion for judgment, or a motion for a new trial.

J

Both issues will be dealt with separately below.
-4-

This case was tried to the court without a jury. The court's factual findings can,
therefore, be challenged now, whether or not they were challenged below. The factual
issues in question are:
(7)

Whether Daniel Armstrong's self-serving testimony, unsupported by any
medical evidence and in fact refuted by the medical evidence, that the
accident aggravated a pre-existing back injury was sufficient to support the
trial court's determination of his special and general damages. (Issue #3,
Pickett's Initial Brief at p. 8);

(8)

Whether two small, almost imperceptible, scars below Jared Armstrong's
jaw-line constitute "permanent disfigurement" as that term is used in Utah
Code Ann. § 31A-22-309(l) and, if so, whether those scars support the
general damages awarded by the trial court. (Issue #4, Pickett's Initial Brief
at p. 9);

(9)

Whether the opinion of Plaintiff s expert (based upon a single evaluation
conducted over three years after the accident) that Taylor Armstrong,
suffered a closed head injury which might impact him in the future, without
more, was sufficient to support the trial court's finding that Taylor sustained
general damages of $350,000, or whether that amount is speculative and
based on conjecture in light of testimony from the expert that he could not
say with any degree of medical certainty what the impact of that head injury
would or might be on Taylor. (Issue #5, Pickett's Initial Brief at p. 10)

Because these issues are all challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence, Pickett's
objection below was sufficient to preserve them for appeal.
B.

The Issue of Daniel Armstrong's Standing to Sue for Damage to
Personal Property He Did Not Own Was Appropriately Raised
Below

At the Hearing, Pickett's counsel objected to the submission of any testimony
regarding the value of Lorene Armstrong's vehicle because Daniel Armstrong did not have
any ownership interest in the vehicle and because that loss had already been paid for by
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insurance. (R. 578 Transcript, p. 41).2 In spite of Pickett's objection, the trial judge
received evidence of the value of the vehicle. Additional evidence elicited during the
hearing confirmed that the vehicle was owned solely by Ms. Armstrong, and that USF&G
and Atlanta Casualty had already compensated them for the loss of the vehicle. (R. 578
Transcript, pp. 48-49.) Pickett's opposition to Daniel Armstrong's recovery for damage to
property he did not own was also contained in his Damages Briefs at R. 287 and R. 535,
(copies of which are attached hereto (without exhibits) as Addendum A).
C.

The Issue of Pickett's Immunity from Some of Plaintiffs Tort
Claims Was Also Properly Preserved on Appeal

Pickett's second issue (whether Utah Code Ann. §31 A-22-309(l) provided him with
partial tort immunity) was also preserved for appeal at the outset of the Damages Hearing
of October 16, 2000. At the Hearing, the issue of the PIP threshold immunity from some
tort claims was dealt with in detail. (R. 578 Transcript, pp. 6-19; copies of those Transcript
pages are attached hereto as Addendum B). Following a detailed and extensive argument,
Judge Wilkinson ruled that the partial tort immunity provided by 31 A-22-309(l) was an
affirmative defense rather than a threshold isssue and that Pickett's default precluded him
from enjoying any such immunity. (R. 578 Transcript pp. 6-19) Because the trial court
ruled from the bench on this issue there should be no question that it was before the court's

2

A transcript of the proceedings of the October 16th, 2001, Damages Hearing
("Damages Hearing") is included in the Record starting at p. 578 and the references to that
transcript will, hereinafter, be referred to as "R. 578 Transcript" followed by references to
specific page numbers.
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consciousness. (SeeR. 578, pg 19, where the trial judge stated, "if you take it up on appeal,
then maybe you'll find out I'm wrong").
The Armstrongs' argument that these issues were only raised "tangentially" at trial
(see Appellee's Brief, p. 14), is therefore without merit. Pickett's first and second issues
were raised in a timely fashion, and were brought to the trial court's attention. Because
Pickett met the Hart standard with respect to both issues, his appeal of such issues was
properly taken.
EL

THE THRESHOLD LIMITATIONS OF UTAH CODE ANN. § 31 A22-309(1) ARE JURISDICTIONAL. AND APPLY EVEN THOUGH
PICKETT'S ANSWER WAS STRICKEN

The Armstrongs argue that the threshold limitations of the PIP statute, Utah Code
Ann. § 31A-22-309(l)(a)(I) — (v), are merely affirmative defenses. The specific threshold
requirements at issue, however, are prefaced by the following language:
(a)

A person who has or is required to have direct benefit coverage under a
policy which includes personal injury protection may not maintain a cause
of action for general damages arising out of personal injuries alleged to
have been caused by an automobile accident, except where the person has
sustained one or more of the following: . . .
(i)

death;

(ii)

dismemberment;

(iii)

permanent disability or permanent impairment based upon objective
findings;

(iv)

permanent disfigurement; or

(v)

medical expenses to a person in excess of $3,000.
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Utah Code Ann. § 31 A-22-309(l) (emphasis added). That statutory prohibition against the
pursuit of general damages in some circumstances should be strictly enforced.
The prohibition against maintaining a cause of action in the absence of meeting one
of the damages thresholds is essentially jurisdictional. A claim for which the court lacks
jurisdiction should be dismissed and should not be entertained. Utah R. Civ. P. 12(h) states
that "whenever it appears by suggestion of the parties or otherwise that the court lacks
jurisdiction of the subject matter, the court shall dismiss the action." This Court has
repeatedly recognized that the Utah PIP Statute provides a complete bar to the pursuit of
some claims. In Allstate v. Ivie, 606 P.2d 1197 (Utah 1980) this Court stated that the
"injured party is precluded from maintaining an action to recover general damages. . .
except where the threshold requirement of Section 9(1) are met. . .
if a party has the security required under Section 5, the no-fault insurance act
confers two privileges: first, he is granted partial tort immunity; second, he is
not personally6 liable for the benefits provided under Section 6. He does,
however, remain liable for customary tort claims, viz., general damages and
economic losses not compensated by the benefits paid under Section 6,
where the threshold provisions of Section 9(1) are met.
Id. at 1200. (Emphasis added)
That case also states that "under Section 9(1) and (2), the tort-feasor [in this case
Pickett] has partial immunity for general damages UNTIL the threshold provisions are met
. . . ." A/, at 1201. (Emphasis added) This court did not hold that the immunity exists only
if pleaded, or that the partial tort immunity granted by Utah's no-fault law had to be pleaded
before it became effective. This Court's statement that individuals are precluded from
pursuing claims for general damages until the threshold requirements are met should be
-8-

enforced in every case, not just where it may be pleaded. The Court must give due regard to
its statement in Allstate that "under the Utah No-Fault Insurance Act, the tort-feasor who
has the required security, is not personally liable to the injured person for payment of
Section 6 benefits." Id. at 1202-03.
When the PIP threshold limitations issue was raised at the Damages Hearing, it was
argued that the trial court did not have jurisdiction to enter a judgment for general damages
unless each plaintiff could show he had met at least one of the enumerated thresholds. The
trial court therefore erred by entering a judgment for general damages after the Armstrongs
failed to produce evidence demonstrating they had met the threshold requirements of
Utah's PIP Statutes.
The threshold requirements of Utah's PIP Statues, unlike the statutes relied upon in
the Armstrongs' Brief, deal with the magnitude of damages. Allegations regarding the
amount of damage claimed by a plaintiff are never deemed admitted based on a
defendant's failure to deny the amount in his answer. See Utah R. Civ. P. 8(d); Taylor v.
United States, 821 F.2d 1428 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding that a statutory damage cap is not an
affirmative defense under Fed. R. Civ. P. 8). Plaintiffs must, therefore, demonstrate they
have met the threshold requirements before they can pursue a claim for general damages.
Because the amount of damage, or severity of the injury, is the central theme of Utah's PIP
threshold limitations, it is not an affirmative defense that needs to be raised in a defendant's
answer.
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In Taylor, the court considered whether California Civil Code § 3333.2, as
incorporated by the Federal Tort Claims Act, was an affirmative defense that was waived by
the government when it failed to raise the statute in its answer. The California statute
limited the amount of general damages a plaintiff could recover against a health care
provider to $250,000 in actions sounding in professional negligence. In Taylor, the
plaintiff argued that a government-owned hospital, which did not contest liability in a
medical tort claim case, had waived the protection of § 3333.2 by failing to raise it in its
answer. See Taylor, 821 F. 2d at 1432.
Rejecting this argument, the Taylor court distinguished between affirmative
defenses and statutes that limit damages, stating "[i]f the Federal Rules do not require
plaintiffs to plead the extent of damages sought, defendants should not be required to plead
the limitation of damages prescribed by § 3333.2." Id. at 1433. The court went on to note
that Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(d) [which is similar to Utah R. Civ. P. 8(d)] "specifies that averments
as to the amount of damage which a defendant does not deny in his answer are not deemed
admitted." Id.
The PIP thresholds involved in this case relate to the amount of the Armstrongs'
damages (namely, the seriousness of the injuries and/or the amount of the medical bills),
and serve to limit a plaintiffs damages regardless of the status of Pickett's Answer. Using
the analysis of Taylor, Utah's PIP threshold requirements would only be affirmative
defenses if the Armstrongs were required by the Rules of Civil Procedure to allege the
amount of their damages and such averments had to be affirmatively denied. Because
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Pickett was not ever required, under Utah R. Civ. P. 8(d), to challenge the alleged severity
of the Armstrongs' injuries in his answer, he should not similarly be required to invoke the
PIP thresholds of Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-309(l) as an affirmative defense in order to be
protected by them. The trial court's decision in this case should have been limited by the
requirements of Utah's PIP Statute.
Even if this Court decides that the PIP thresholds are an affirmative defense, public
policy considerations should excuse Atlanta Casualty, Pickett's insurer, from being bound
by the striking of Pickett's pleadings for his failure to cooperate in defense of his case.
Affirmative defenses must be timely pleaded to avoid the potential for prejudice and unfair
surprise to the plaintiff. See Sanderson-Cruz v. United States, 88 F. Supp. 2d 388, 391 (E.
D. Perm. 2000) (holding that Pennsylvania's PIP threshold statute was an affirmative
defense that the government was required to raise in answer to auto accident claim). As the
Sanderson court noted, "the fact that a defendant can only learn whether the limited tort
defense is available after doing some initial discovery weighs against treating the limited
tort defense as an affirmative defense." See Sanderson-Cruz, 88 F. Supp. 2d at 391, n.3.
In this case, the Armstrongs' counsel was well aware that, although Pickett had been
defaulted for his failure to participate in discovery, Pickett's insurer, Atlanta Casualty, was
still involved in the case for the purpose of contesting the amount of damages. Allowing
the threshold limitations to be raised as a defense at the Damages Hearing did not result in
any prejudice or unfair surprise. The existence of the PIP threshold limitations simply
requires evidence that they have been met before general damages can be awarded. The
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failure to produce such evidence does nothing more than deprive Plaintiffs of damages they
are not entitled to receive anyway.
As the transcript of the Damages Hearing reflects, counsel for the Armstrongs was
prepared to meet the challenge of the PIP thresholds presented by Pickett's arguments, and
in fact persuaded the trial judge that the thresholds did not apply. The Armstrongs therefore
suffered no prejudice by the invocation of the PIP thresholds at the Damages Hearing.
Utah Code Ann. § 31 A-22-303(6) precludes an insurer from avoiding liability to a
third party (up to its policy limits) for its insured's lack of cooperation, unless it can
demonstrate there is collusion between the insured and the claimant. Furthermore, subpart
5 of that Section imposes a duty upon insurers to defend their insureds in good faith
"against any claim or suit seeking damages which would be payable under the policy." Id.
While insurers are statutorily obligated to defend their insureds against all claims, and pay
up to their policy limits, irrespective of their insured's willingness to assist them, they
should not be saddled with the additional burden of being deprived of the threshold
requirements of the PIP Statutes when their insureds refuse or fail to cooperate in a case.
Utah Code Ann. § 31 A-l-102 states that Utah's Insurance Code (Title § 31A
Chapters 1 through 35) was passed to "ensure that policyholders, claimants, and insurers
are treated fairly and equitably," Utah Code Ann. § 31 A-1-102(2), and Utah's insurance
laws must be "liberally construed" to achieve that purpose, Utah Code Ann. § 31 A-l201(1). It would be patently unfair to allow one insurer or insured to be protected from
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claims for general damages in some cases while another insurer or insured is exposed to
such damages, even when it did nothing wrong.
In this case, Pickett's counsel made every reasonable effort to secure Pickett's
cooperation in defending this suit, and to avoid a default judgment. Taking the protections
provided by the PIP thresholds away from Atlanta Casualty would not only punish Atlanta
Casualty for something over which it had no control (i.e. Pickett's failure to cooperate), but
it would also undermine the goals championed by the Utah Legislature in enacting the
insurance statutes. The no-fault statutes in particular were enacted to stem the rising costs
of automobile accident insurance and provide for the efficient resolution of claims
involving small damages. Neither goal would be advanced by eliminating the threshold
protection which the legislature has created. Both goals, in fact, would be harmed by
making the no-fault threshold requirements an affirmative defense.
For the foregoing reasons, the trial court's ruling that the threshold limitations of
Utah Code Ann. § 31 A-22-309(l) provide an affirmative defense that was waived by the
striking of Pickett's pleadings should be reversed. As a consequence, the awards for
general damages to Daniel, Jared and Taylor Armstrong should be reversed as well because
they failed to meet the threshold requirements when they fail to produce admissible
evidence of permanent impairment, permanent disfigurement, or medical expenses in
excess of $3000 as required by the statute.
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IV.

PICKETT STIPULATED TO THE ADMISSION OF PLAINTIFFS'
EXHIBITS AS TO FORM AND FOUNDATION, BUT RESERVED
OBJECTIONS ON ANY OTHER GROUNDS

The Armstrongs claim that Pickett stipulated wholesale to the admission of all of
the Armstrongs' Exhibits, contained in a black binder marked "Plaintiffs' Exhibit 1." That
misconstrues the agreement. The true nature of the stipulation regarding the admission of
the exhibits was discussed at the Damages Hearing of October 16, 2000, where counsel for
Pickett stated "we've stipulated to everything. At least, we're not going to object to the
form and foundation of anything . . . ." R. 578 at pg. 21.
Counsel for the Armstrongs raised no objection to this statement, which clearly
reserved Pickett's right to object to any portion of the exhibits on any other ground. In
essence, Pickett's counsel extended a time, effort and expense-saving favor to the
Armstrongs and the trial court by agreeing not to require the authentication of every
document the Armstrongs wished to introduce. The Armstrongs now wish to turn that
courtesy into a reason to recover inflated and non-recoverable damages by arguing that the
trial court could rely on any evidence contained in "Plaintiffs' Exhibit 1," whether or not
such evidence was admissible, relevant or actually introduced at trial or through the briefing
process.
All objections raised by Pickett during the Damages Hearing, and in Pickett's
Damages Briefs that do not relate to form or foundation of the exhibits should have been
considered by the trial court. The trial court's consideration of any inadmissible evidence
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that was objected to by Pickett, or which was not properly introduced at trial, is therefore
properly appealable.
V.

PICKETT ADEQUATELY MARSHALED THE EVIDENCE THAT
SUPPORTED THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS

The Armstrongs misconstrue the nature of Pickett's burden to the marshal the
evidence on appeal. That burden has been clearly articulated. This Court has instructed that
"[t]o successfully challenge a trial couifs findings of fact on appeal, c[a]n appellant must
marshal the evidence in support of the findings and then demonstrate that despite this
evidence, the trial court's findings are so lacking in support as to be "against the clear
weight of the evidence," thus making them 'clearly erroneous.'" See Valcarce v. Fitzgerald,
961 P.2d 305, 312 (Utah 1998) (citations omitted).
Pickett does not have to marshal evidence in support of findings that are not
challenged on appeal. Nevertheless, in support of the claim that Pickett failed to marshal
the evidence, the Armstrongs photocopied the entire trial exhibit book (well over seven
hundred pages of material) and declared that it is fatter than Pickett's Addenda, Volume 2
(containing all the evidence marshaled by Pickett). From this, the Armstrongs conclude
that Pickett has failed to marshal all the evidence that supported the trial court's
determinations.
The Armstrongs, however, have failed to identify, with particularity, a single scrap
of unmarshaled evidence which provides support for any of the trial court's findings
challenged by Pickett. In order to demonstrate that Pickett failed to marshal all the
evidence the Armstrongs must perform two simple steps. First, identify a challenged
-15-

finding; and second, present, at a minimum, some additional evidence that Pickett failed to
produce that supports that particular finding. Instead, the Armstrongs ask the Court to wade
through over seven hundred pages of evidence that may or may not be relevant to any of the
findings that Pickett has challenged, and then compare that to the evidence marshaled by
Pickett. In doing so, the Armstrongs have failed to provide the Court with any meaningful
assistance in understanding their allegation that the evidence has not been marshaled, nor
have they provided Pickett with a reasonable opportunity to demonstrate that the allegedly
missing evidence WAS appropriately marshaled.
The Armstrongs have not demonstrated that the evidence marshaled by Pickett is
incomplete. Instead, they seek to have this Court carry that burden, by sifting through the
record and, on its own, identify what Pickett has omitted. Because the Armstrongs'
assertion that Pickett failed to marshal all the evidence is not properly supported it should
not be considered by this Court.
VI.

THE ARMSTRONGS FAILED TO MEET THE NO-FAULT
THRESHOLDS

Because Jared and Daniel Armstrong did not meet the threshold limitations of Utah
Code Ann. § 31A-22-309(l) by showing permanent impairment or permanent
disfigurement, it was improper for the trial court to award them general damages.
A. Jared Armstrong's Scars Did Not Meet the Statutory Threshold
Point VI(A)(1) of the Armstrongs' argument, regarding whether Jared Armstrong's
scars are "permanently disfiguring" as required by Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-309(l), does
not respond in any meaningful way to Pickett's Brief. The Armstrongs cite one dictionary
-16-

dictionary definition and assert, without support, that "Jared and his mother both described
the scars as disfiguring."
When asked, in his deposition, how the scars affected him, Jared testified "I just
look in the mirror and I see them, and I wish they weren't there." See Pickett's Addendum,
Tab B-3, pg. 8. The medical records of Dr. Jed Bindrup refer to Jared's complaint, in 1995,
that the scars looked like "big zits." Plaintiffs Exhibit 1 at 140.3 Nowhere in the record
did Jared, or his mother, specifically describe the scars as "disfiguring."
Moreover, Jared's and his mother's opinion of the scars are not determinative;
rather, the plain language of the statute is controlling. A determination of whether the scars
are "permanently disfiguring" is simply a matter of applying the statute to the facts. The
best illustration of those facts, and the only ones before the trial court since Jared did not
testify, can be found in two photographs found in the record at Plaintiffs Exhibit 1, pg. 148
and a third photograph at Exhibit 1 to Jared Armstrong's Telephone Deposition, beginning
at Plaintiffs Exhibit 1, Tab U. The first two photographs show barely perceptible scars
along Jared's left jaw line. For this picture, Jared was required to tilt his head and the
camera angle is from below to emphasize the markings. Similarly, the third and more

3

While Pickett's initial Brief does refer to pp. 137-140 of Plaintiff s Exhibit 1 as
portions of the record that support the trial court's judgment, (see Pickett's Brief at pg. 19,
f 17(a)) these pages were inadvertently left out of Pickett's Addenda, Vol. 2. Pages 137140 of Plaintiff s Exhibit 1 contain medical records regarding Jared's scars. The
photographic exhibit to the Telephone Deposition of Jared Armstrong, found at Plaintiffs
Exhibit 1, Tab U, was also referred to in Pickett's initial Brief but was also inadvertently
omitted from the Addenda (see Pickett's Brief at pg. 19, f 15 and pg. 39). In order to
facilitate this Court's review of the evidence we have included the missing pages with this
Reply Brief as Addendum C.
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recent photograph shows the skin stretched above the jaw line, which emphasizes and
broadens scars that would ordinarily not be visible. Neither of these photographs was taken
with Jared in a natural posture or from a natural viewer's perspective.
These minor injuries are not the type of injuries the legislature envisioned when it
used the language "permanent disfigurement." This appears especially so, given the context
of the statute, which speaks of dismemberment and death in the same section. The trial
court therefore erred as a matter of law when it awarded Jared general damages for this
injury.
B.

Pickett's Counsel Did Not "Acknowledge" That Jared's Scarring
Met the Threshold of Permanent Disfigurement

In light of the general argument presented by Pickett's counsel that the threshold
limitations of Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-109(l) were a bar to the Armstrongs' claims for
general damages and the trial court's prior ruling on that issue, it cannot be properly said
that Pickett's counsel "acknowledged" Jared had met the threshold. (R. 578, pp. 5-19.) The
broader issue of whether the thresholds described in subsections (i)-(v) of the statue apply
to this case encompasses the specific issue of whether Jared's scarring constituted a
"permanent disfigurement" under § 31A-22-309(l)(d). Because the trial judge ruled,
generally, that the threshold limitations were an affirmative defense that had been waived by
Pickett's default, Pickett's counsel was not required to raise, as a separate issue, each
particular threshold described by the statute. It was sufficient, for purposes of this appeal,
that the general issue was raised and resolved by the trial court.
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C.

Daniel Armstrong's Back Injury Did Not Meet Any of the Threshold
Requirements of Utah Code Ann. S 31A-22-309(n

Daniel Armstrong could have met the threshold requirements of Utah Code Ann. §
31A-22-309(l) in either of two ways. First, he could have shown that, under subsection
(v), he had medical expenses in excess of $3,000 as a result of the accident. Second, he
could have shown that, under subsection (iii), he incurred "permanent disability or
permanent impairment based upon objective findings." Daniel Armstrong, however, did
neither.
The Armstrongs' Brief sustained medical expenses arising from the accident of at
least $3,823.00. See Armstrong Brief at 23. According to the trial court's Findings,
however, which were drafted by the Armstrong's own counsel, "Daniel sustained a total of
$2,884.97 in special damages relating to medical treatment of injuries resulting from the
collision."4 R. 552 (Pickett's Addenda, Vol. 1, Tab J). Because the Armstrongs have not
cross-appealed and challenged this finding, this figure has crystallized and cannot now be
challenged. Daniel Armstrong therefore failed to meet the threshold of § 31A-22309(l)(e), requiring medical expenses in excess of $3,000.

4

It is also insightful to note that the $2,884.97 figure arrived at by the trial court
included $1,073.00 for a leather executive chair with lumbar support that Daniel Armstrong
claimed to have purchased based upon the inadmissible hearsay testimony of a chiropractor
who did not even treat him or see him for any injury related to or arising from this accident,
[R. at 286, 526, 548] and $1,071.22 for a CT-Scan from LDS Hospital performed over 22
months after the accident for "back pains down the right leg, moderate for one year," (10
months after this accident) without any evidence to support a finding that the CT-Scan was
necessary or reasonable because of the accident [R. 286 and p. 103 of Plaintiffs' Exhibit
D.]
-19-

Also in their Brief, the Armstrongs claim that "while Dan Armstrong did not have a
physician testify that he suffered a specific percentage impairment. . . there was
nonetheless objective testimony of his permanent impairment." See Armstrong Brief at 23
(emphasis added). However, "permanent impairment based upon objective findings" is
statutory language. "Objective findings," of impairment, for purposes of the statute, has
been interpreted by the Utah Court of Appeals to mean the professional opinion of a
physician. See McNair v. Farris, 944 P.2d 392, 395-96 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (affirming
summary judgment for defendant in an auto accident case where plaintiff had failed to
secure the opinion of a doctor that he was permanently disabled or impaired as required by
§31A-22-309(l)(c)).
Nowhere in the record is there any testimony, affidavit, or even a deposition of a
physician, or anyone else for that matter, offering an opinion as to the permanency of
Daniel Armstrong's back condition, let alone any evidence of objective findings of a
permanent impairment. The record does not contain any medical charts or records that
show Daniel has experienced back pain because of this accident. By his own admission,
however, it is clear that Daniel had a history of back trouble before his accident with
Pickett. How much of Daniel's back pain is attributable to the January 1996 accident
involving Pickett and how much of it is attributable to other causes is thus a complex
medical question. No expert opinion was offered to show that Daniel's condition was in
fact worse after the January 1996 accident, or that any worsening of Daniel's condition was
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I

See Pickett's Brief at 42-43. In light of Dr. Bigler's unwillingness to provide expert
opinion about the extent of Taylor's injuries or his future limitations, the trial court's
finding of a limitation and the consequent award of general damages was clearly erroneous,
and the general damage award of $350,000 for Taylor should be overturned.
B.

Jared Armstrong's Personal Injury Judgment

With regard to Jared's scars, the photographs in the record clearly show that both
before and after his surgery, they are scarcely visible unless his skin is pulled up over the
jaw line or the scars are viewed from obscure angles. See Plaintiffs Exhibit 1, pg. 148 and
Exhibit 1 of Jared Armstrong's Telephone Deposition, at Plaintiffs Exhibit 1, Tab U.
Moreover, Jared's only testimony regarding the impact of those scars upon his life was that
he "wish[es] they weren't there." See Pickett's Addendum, Tab B-3, pg. 8. The $10,000
judgment for general damages for that minimal scarring was not supported by substantial
evidence, is clearly erroneous and should be overturned.
C.

Daniel Armstrong's Personal Injury Judgment

With regard to Daniel Armstrong's back injury, there was no substantial evidence
connecting the January 1996 accident to Daniel's current complaints. As stated in Point
VI(C) above, there was no expert medical testimony of permanent impairment to support
Daniel's subjective testimony, and there was absolutely no admissible evidence that the
January 1996 accident was responsible for any aggravation of his pre-existing back pain.
The $10,000 award to him, was therefore, clearly erroneous and should also be set aside.
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D.

Daniel Armsuuujg b rroperty Judgment for His Wife's
Automobile

Finally, the award to Daniel Armstrong for damages to his wife's car should be
overturned because he did not have an ownership interest in it [Plaintiffs Exhibit • :: 4]
mil In i .ujse In uliull mi il |iii i lliiiii iii\ fnnt(Kji(y ilaniaucs iiii lir, t ninpllaitil

Llum I I

n^l'it

to transfer or encumber the vehicle because he did not have title to it. Because he had no
property right in the vehicle, it follows that he was not entitled to sue for damages to it,
I he Armstrongs eile \tiish i \Lush, M ' { I1 \J " # S S i I l| ili ( | \\^
proposition that Lorene Armstrong's Suburban was marital property

\WM\ tmi the

Based upon this

notion, the> ariiue dial Daniel had a sufficient interest in the automobile, and thus standing
to sue 1 <;.,....

i Tnwevei

concept ui m a n i a ' ; T rvn

„ vrmstrongs provide i 10 suppc i I: foi the notion that il
<•'nrrMcable to this case.

rhis is a tort case — an action at lavv — and not a proceeding in equity. The concept
of "mas iiai piupcrtv

Ad not, therefore, even appl *

niiinl.il propoil'i - nh IN Ihc . .iilt l*f - Ci ilPnUtr .lt'lnui

• ,.,«•:>;, wclinc* ;iie concept of
I lir Nimstmnj's h.ne failed1 Incite

any authority which holds that the concept of '"marital property " entitles a party to sue in the
name of his or her spouse for damages to that spouse's separately titled property > u;or a
m.iiil.d piopert\ vyslniii lliiki I il illi ,

i- IHIIM» .in \\u iiiiinnaee Insls »\i« 111 iHimse i^n 1 - < "<")

manages assets that he or she brings into or acquires during the marriage." Leslie j . Hums
et al, Family Law 330 (1006> Such assets become shared assets only when the marr~~r
ei ids 5 ee i <:i B e c a u s e 1 eneme .iiul I hiiiiHI A i m s l i u n g iiere iii.iiiiietl.il ilie liiiie I

23

Suburban was damaged, and the title was in her name, the Suburban was her property and she
was the only party entitled to sue for its loss.
Even if we assume, for purposes of argument, that the concept of marital property
could entitle Daniel to sue for damages to his wife's automobile, no evidence was
presented below to show that the automobile was in fact marital property. In making an
equitable distribution of property in divorce, courts generally award property acquired by
one spouse by gift and inheritance during the marriage to the receiving spouse. See
Mortensen v. Mortensen, 760 P.2d 304, 309 (Utah 1988).
No evidence was presented below to show how Lorene Armstrong acquired title to
her Suburban. If relatives had gifted it to her, or if she had purchased it through non-marital
assets, the vehicle would not be marital property, and Daniel could not have any interest in
it. Because the trial court made no findings regarding whether the Suburban was marital or
non-marital property, it could not properly assume that it was marital property and award
Daniel Armstrong a judgment for the loss.
Moreover, Lorene Armstrong was not a claimant in this lawsuit as the Armstrongs
claim. Her name was on the pleadings only in a representative capacity, as guardian ad
litem for her son, Taylor. Thus, she was only entitled to represent his interests, not her
own.
Finally, the Armstrongs' Complaint did not even pray for damages to the automobile.
See R. at 1-3. The Complaint was never amended, and Pickett's counsel objected in a
timely manner to the introduction of any evidence regarding damages to the vehicle at the
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R. 578, pg 41. Pickett's due process rights were violated when the trial court considered
this evidence because he had no notice that such a claim would even be made at any x!— -

should be reversed.
Vlll

jt j s

BECAUSE THE ARMSTRONGS HAVE NOT CROSS APPEALED.
THEY ARE NOT ENTITLED TO RAISE THE ISSUE OF WHETHER
PICKETT'S COUNSEL HAD AUTHORITY TO APPEAR
wejj

established law that an appellee seeking to raise an issue before the

Supi erne Court on appeal must cross appeal, or the issue *A :.V ; * V considered
American ( o*i> , .

«jnd*uun;

\ -'

.*'....

•<"->-•*

....*.

JcJangd

' ^tah 1982).

Nevertheless, the Armstrongs wish to raise the issue of whether Pickett'' s counsel
had authority to appear in the trial court on Pickat ^ oo,dii
atten lpt t :) i: ais 2 tl: lis issi le v

-

Moreover ... Xrmstrongs
•

'

I le * as

preserved. They claim that they filed a motion under Ltali Code Ann. J " S o l - J J ,
requesting that Pickett's counsel give proof of his authority to appear, The alleged motion,
liuMU'vci

<ioe,s in mi t(»pt\ti ill I In ni

n i l i. I i r n 1 flu*

^ i U r d u ni! 1

i Limn in i p p i M f s l K '

i

|i

1], and, with the exception of the Motion to dismiss the Appeal on those grounds tiled with
this Court, Pickett cannot find such a n lotion elsewhere in the record,
Additional I >, counsel Urn the Aniistiongs concednl il I In.1 ( k'lul UM IH J'THini
Damages Hearing, that Pickett's attorne> could defend the case as far as the extent oi

.25-

damages was concerned. (SeeR. 578, at pg. 9, where counsel for the Armstrongs stated, "if
he has some argument that the medical expenses are too high, or if he has some argument
that Taylor Armstrong, you know, doesn't suffer a brain injury, then certainly he's entitled
to put that on.") The Armstrongs are thus not entitled to raise the issue now, and this Court
should decline to consider it.
CONCLUSION
Pickett adequately preserved the legal issues of: (1) whether Daniel Armstrong was
entitled to a judgment for property damage to property he did not own; and (2) whether
Pickett and/or his insurer were entitled to any of the protections afforded by Utah's nofault statutes for this appeal. Because he did not have to take any steps to preserve his right
to challenge the factual findings of the trial court in a case tried before the bench, the
appealed factual determinations are also properly before this Court. Additionally, Pickett
appropriately marshaled all of the evidence which supported the challenged factual
determinations. The Armstrongs failed to point to any specific supportive evidence in the
records that was not marshaled by Pickett. Therefore, the factual determinations and
sufficiency of the evidence are also appropriately before this Court.
Pickett's stipulation as to the form and foundation of the Armstrong's proposed
exhibits did not equate to a stipulation as to the admissibility or weight of any of the
evidence.
Public policy, fairness to insureds and insurance companies, well-established case
law, the plain language of the statute and the purpose of Utah's no-fault law, all indicate that

-26-

the threshold requirements of Utah Code Anno. §31A-22-309(l) prevent a cause of action
from arising until or unless those threshold requirements are met Therefore, even in light
of Pickett's default, it was inappropriate toi tin: inu! court to award the Armstrongs any
.itii4Mnil lui giinnal iliiiiiii^cs whni llirir \\ ,is not siillu unit admissible evidence to e stablish
that they met those threshold requirements.
Even if the threshold requirements do not bar the Armstrong's claims for general
I'Liiiiagrs in (lui i asi1 IIIIR' damages i^.inlnj h\ lln iliii ill i null " nc rlcaiiv i*HTssn« in light
of the admissible evidence presented at the hearing and in the parties' Damages Briefs.
r

>n (he forgoing reasons, and the reasons set forth in Pickett's Initial Brief +hc

determination of damages based upon the evidence before this Court.
R ESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this /".;*da> of January. 2002.

Attorney £-* \rv-.* '-w* n L i "

Steven B. Smith
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this / 4 day of January, 2002, two true and correct copies
of the foregoing REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT was served upon counsel of record by
depositing the same in the United States mail, postage prepaid and addressed as follows:
Robert H. Wilde, No. 3466
Wilde & Associates
935 East South Union Avenue, Suite D102
Midvale, Utah 84047
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1

A

Periodically.

2

Q

Okay, can you flip over to Page 545?

3

Down to number

four, medical history, is that a part you filled out?

4

A

Yes.

5

Q

And is that your writing where it says some blood in

6

urine, result severe sore throat when child?

7

A

Yes.

8

Q

Okay, what about up on the next side where it says

9

sleep rest pattern, is that your writing as well?

10

A

Yes.

11

Q

And that says do you have any problems sleeping and

12

you marked the box yes?

13

A

Yes. "

14

Q

And then you wrote back pain after three to four

15

hours of laying?

16

A

Yes.

17

Q

Can you go back to Tab A?

Very first page.

The

18

owner of the vehicle damaged in this accident was Lorene

19

Armstrong, correct?

20

A

Yes.

21

Q

Okay.

22

A

Yes.

23 I

Q

She was the titled owner?

24

A

Yes.

25

Q

Flip over to Tab J if you could.

She was the registered owner?

Down on the bottom
48
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560.70, all of which have already been paid by Glen Pickett's insurer. Mr. Armstrong, therefore,
tiould not recover any amount for general damages pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-309.
PROPERTY DAMAGE CLAIM
Daniel Armstrong does not have standing to pursue a claim for property in which he does not
ive an ownership interest. Lorene Armstrong was the registered and titled owner of the vehicle
imaged in this accident. She, and only she, could bring a claim for property damage to that vehicle.
Yanscript at p. 48, lines 17-24, attached hereto as Exhibit A, and the Accident Report, p. 01 of
chibit A on file with this Court].
Nevertheless, even if Mr. Armstrong is entitled to pursue his wife's claim for property
mage, he already received full and complete reimbursement from the insurance companies
/olved in this accident for that property damage. Allowing Mr. Armstrong to recover any
ditional funds would result in a double recovery for the property damage sustained. Mr.
mstrong also claims he is entitled to recover for items not included in the insurance companies'
imates of the value of the damaged vehicle such as stereo equipment, speakers, and a television
He, however, retrieved all of those items from his vehicle and testified that they didn't look too
)d, but could be reutilized. [Transcript at p. 49, lines 19-22, attached hereto as Exhibit A]. He
•uld not, therefore, recover any amount for those claimed damages. Mr. Armstrong failed to show
t the accident in this case destroyed the extra equipment for which he now seeks reimbursement.
thermore, because there is no logical explanation why he could not re-use the property, or
ience produced regarding its current condition, Mr. Armstrong should not be allowed to recover
amount on his property damage claim.
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Armstrong woikol out belm." Jin! altri \\w ,n .KITJI .uid the only claimed difference was thefrequencyof
lis work-outs. Because there is no evidence of medical necessity or reasonableness for the chair or the spa,
and because those claimed expenses would has c IVMI u uirul w Lefli"1 tins ,u , jJmt h.id happened or not,
lhc\ if in in LI ,, f fv awarded to Mr. Armstrong as a windfall at Mr. Pickett's expense.
General Damages
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Daniel Armstrong's Property Damage Claim
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1

are no defenses, no affirmative defenses, and so accordingly,

2

the no-fault statute it's not a defense.

3

defense.

4

have two expert witnesses here, I have a police officer and a

5

toxicologist to establish the level that Mr. Pickett's

6

inebriation at the time purely as that goes to allowing the

7

Court to enter an award of punitive damages, and I think that

8

the Court needs to have evidence on his prior alcohol related

9

conviction and his inebriation in order to appropriately assess

10

A causation is not a

We're only looking at the amounts of damages, and I

the level of punitive damage.

11

But other than that, I think the Court is exactly

12

right.

13

since this is an automobile accident and particularly as it

14

relates to Taylor we're looking at, we're going to ask the

15

Court for a substantial amount of general damages.

16

to be some sort of evidence that's going to allow the Court to

17

understand what's an appropriate amount of general damages and

18

we have the deposition which we're going to read excerpts of

19

Dr. Bigler to address the amount of general damages.

20

believe that's exactly right.

21

the amount of damages and all those other issues have been

22

resolved by Mr. Pickett's default.

23

That we're looking solely at the amount of damages and

There needs

But I

Ail we're doing is looking at

MR. SMITH: Well, we disagree, Your Honor.

In case of

24

Allstate v. Ivy, Bear River v. Wall, both in the Court of

25

Appeals and the Utah Supreme Court, it's explicitly stated that

1

a plaintiff who has received recompense through personal injury

2

protection benefits should not even pray for the damages for

3

which they received from the insurance company that's

4

protecting them at the time.

5

that the statute 31A.2-309, Subsection 6 provides immunity to

6

those individuals who sec

7

required by the statute and that in this case Glen Pickett

8

provided the security required by the statute and therefore is

9

in, he is entitled to immunity from the claims for damages

They have a, that there's a, and

- who provide the security necessary

10

represented by what was paid in PIP benefits.

11

are paid by the under, by the, by the injured parties insurance

12

carrier and that injured parties insurance carrier has a

13

statutory right of subrogation in arbitration, mandatory

14

arbitration against Glen Pickett's insurance company.

15

things have taken place.

16

would represent a double recovery, and it would be contrary to

17

statute and Utah law to permit them to plead for those damages,

18

to pray for those damage, to recover those damages when that's

19

been done one time already.

20
21
22
23

The PIP benefits

Those

That it would be inequitable, it

THE COURT: Well, how do you mean it's been done one
time already?
MR. SMITH: USF&G, the Armstrong's insurance company
has claimed -

24

THE COURT: Oh.

25

MR. SMITH:

- submitted a claim against Land Casualty

1

and Land Casualty resolved that claim with USF&G.

2

THE COURT: But you're just talking the PIP payments.

3 I

MR. SMITH: PIP payments, as far as PIP payments go.

4

Correct.

5

any claim for damages for PIP payments, for PIP benefits that

6

were received by the Armstrongs.

7

Then under Utah law, Glen Pickett, has immunity for

THE COURT: Well, are you representing Mr. Pickett or

8

are you representing the insurance company on their

9

subrogation.

10
11
12
13
14
15
16

MR. SMITH: The party's Glen Pickett.

That's who's

being sued in this case.
THE COURT: I know the party's Glen Pickett.

But

answer my question.
MR. SMITH: I'm representing Glen Pickett.

His

insurance company has retained me to protect his interests.
THE COURT: Well, then you're representing the

17

insurance company in a sub-litigation.

18

position here today that you are here to, to minimize the

19

damages in protection of the insurance company under

20

subrogation?

21

MR. SMITH: To minimize the damages against both Glen

22

Pickett and the insurance -

23

THE COURT: Well -

24

MR. SMITH:

25

Are you taking the

have to pay.

- and that the insurance company would

If the insurance company could, they would have

1

revoked coverage and they would have said under non-cooperation

2

provision of /the policy you have no coverage, you have no right

3

to a defense, no right to indemnification.

4

that's not available, that the insurance company cannot reject

5

coverage from the Armstrongs, because of their insured's non-

6

cooperation unless there's evidence of collusion between the

7

insured and the claimants..

8

evidence of collusion between Mr. Pickett and the Armstrongs.

9

But we do believe that there's a right that Glen Pickett has to

10

make the arguments before this Court that would reduce whatever

11

damages he would have to pay.

12

obligation, statutory, contractual obligation to do that in

13

defending him and that's an obligation that they've undertaken

14

by hiring me.

15

Under Utah law

This case we don't have any

The insurance company has an

MR. WILDE: But that's not a reduction of damages.

16

That's an affirmative defense.

An affirmative defense like all

17

the other aspects of Mr. Pickett's pleadings have been

18

stricken, and so if he has some argument that the medical

19

expenses are too high, or if he has some argument that Taylor

20

Armstrong, you know, doesn't suffer a brain injury, then

21

certainly he's entitled to put that on.

22

to put on any of the other affirmative defenses he would be

23

entitled to put on.

24

negligence or, or the no-fault statute.

25

defenses have been stricken, and so all we're here looking for

But he's not entitled

He's not entitled to address comparative
His affirmative

1

here today is the amount of the damage.

2

THE COURT: Well, as I'm looking at this counsel, this

3

has taken me somewhat by surprise.

4

and I thought you were just going to come and of course put on

5

evidence to damages and that was it, and but it appears it's

6

more than that.

7

listen to what you say that I think Mr. Wilde is right, that I

8

think the affirmative defenses, as far as the liability is

9

concerned, would not be available to the, to the defendant.

10

I, of course your pre-trial

I'm the opinion, just as I'm sitting here and

I think that the defendant, counsel, is representing

11

the insurance company of their interest under subrogation.

12

That they're the ones that are going to have to pay this and

13

therefore they're entitled to come out and to question and go

14

into anything and any defenses as to damages I think they can

15

raise.

I'll, I'll, now when you say comparative, I don't know

16 I how you're going to raise the 17

MR. SMITH: We had not planned on raising any -

18 I

THE COURT: Okay, I was going to say -

19

MR. SMITH: - in comparative.

20

THE COURT:

21

- get into that because I was getting

ready to question.

22

MR. SMITH: And I agree with the Court in that regard.

23

THE COURT: That, that I think that they would be,

24

have the right to question the witnesses and to present any,

25

any defenses of which they could raise as far as the amount of
10

1

damages are concerned-

2

to hear from you both right now.

3

you're entitled to a jury if they're going to go into that,

4

those matters, and to have them hear it and make that

5

determination.

6

Now, if I'm wrong in that I'll, I want
That's why I said Mr. Wilde,

MR. WILDE: If in fact we're going to go into those

7

matters we'd like a jury.

8

Honor.

9

If they have provided counsel for Mr. Pickett -

10

I don't think that's correct, Your

The insurance company is not a party to this action.

THE COURT: Well, let me just talk to you Mr. Wilde,

11

and I'm just ruling off the top of my head, that the insurance

12

company is not a party to this action.

13

Pickett has a contract with the insurance company to represent

14

him and to protect him.

15

matter, I think the, the rights of Mr. Pickett are subrogated

16

to the insurance company for them to come in and to protect

17

their interest as far as this is concerned.

18

are not a party, they are still the one that's going to be

19

paying at least part of it, maybe all of it, as far as the

20

amounts are concerned, and I think they can raise defenses on

21

the question of damages under the right of subrogation.

22

that's my feeling.

23

Mr. Pickett, Mr.

If Mr. Pickett defaults in this

Even though they

MR. WILDE: Well, let me respond to that.

Now

Let's say

24

that we filed the lawsuit and said Glen Pickett ran over these

25

people and injured them and itemize the general [inaudible] of
11

1

damages and said, Let's have the Court or jury or someone

2

identify what those damages were.

3

Pickett instead of going to his insurance company, had an

4

insurance, forgot about the insurance, didn't realize he ought

5

to go to the insurance company, went to someone who's going to

6

be admitted in this session, the new admittees to the bar which

7

are going to be sworn in on the 18th of this month, and this

8

person looked at this and said ah, tort law.

9

and raise the tort defenses, but did not bother to consult the

And let's suppose that Mr.

I'm gonna go in

10

insurance company.

11

out about the no-fault statute.

12

of things and just showed up and argued general tort law.

13

pretty clear that we're going to be entitled to get whatever

14

damages come out of that and be able to respond to whatever

15

affirmative defenses that person raises.

16

Did not bother to read the code and find
Did not do any of those sorts
It's

Now, if in the process, Mr. Pickett did to that

17

attorney what he's done to Mr. Smith, and failed to show up,

18

failed to participate in his deposition and so on, then it's

19

pretty clear that having his answer stricken, having his

20

pleadings stricken, we're going to be able to come in here and

21

just put on the amount of damages.

22

Now I don't see how that differs in any fashion from

23

where we are now, because an insurance company is not a party,

24

and the fact that Mr. Smith is hired by the insurance company

25

doesn't mean he can come in here and represent the insurance
12

1

company's interest with regards to that subrogation.

2

entitled to represent Mr. Pickett's interest, and whatever

3

problems the insurance company's have behind the scene, they're

4

certainly entitled to address.

5

those defenses are still viable after the pleadings have been

6

stricken.

7

He's

But that doesn't mean that

THE COURT: Now in your example, counsel, of course

8

the insurance company had no knowledge, they were not brought

9

into it and therefore, it would follow, under my thinking, the

10

insurance company would not be liable for the amount of damages

11

of which were awarded to you because they were never contacted,

12

never brought into this lawsuit of which you proposed.

13

Here the insurance company is present and they're

14

representing their interests under the subrogation.

15

words, you may ask for 50 million and, and I grant you that

16

amount.

17

saying look this is not a $50 million case.

18

million case and put on the evidence to prove that.

19

In other

The insurance company has a right to resist that
This is only a $1

MR. WILDE: Well, but see, that ignores the totality

20

of the insurance circumstances.

For example, we've got Mr.

21

Pickett here with the statutory minimum policy.

22

alter the fact that Mr. Armstrong has an under insured motorist

23

policy for $300,000, and the, their -

That doesn't

24

THE COURT: What, what you say there is a no, 300,000?

25

MR. WILDE: 300,000 under insured policy, so if the
13

1

Court awards a judgment against Mr. Pickett -

2

THE COURT: That's against his insurance company.

3

MR. WILDE: That's exactly right, and his insurance

4

company is not here today being represented for exactly the

5

same reason that Mr. Pickett's insurance company is not here

6

being represented because all of those claims are taken care of

7

behind the scenes, after the fact, through inter-company

8

arbitration insurance that they just sort out between

9

themselves, what the subrogation rights are and who gets to pay

10
11

what.
If we read the pleadings from Mr. Pickett, there is

12

no where alleged as a defense the fact that his insurance

13

company has a right to subrogation, because they may well do

14

that, and that's contractual right.

15

this tort case, and the fact that we have Mr. Pickett

16

represented by Mr. Pickett's counsel and those cases he cited

17

are Allstate v. Ivy and they involve insurance companies in the

18

caption of the case, because we had individuals suing the

19

insurance company and insurance companies suing individuals for

20

subrogation and they certainly are big boys and they know how

21

to do that.

22

to have the affirmative defense of the no-fault statute or

23

anything else raised once his pleadings have been stricken.

24
25

But that doesn't fit into

But that doesn't mean that Mr. Pickett is entitled

THE COURT: Well, I'm not saying he has the right
under the no-fault statute.

Well, that could go to damages I
14

1

guess, somewhat.

Well let me hear from Mr. Smith, and I've

2

been arguing your position here and I'm not, I'm not sure where

3

we're going.

4

MR. SMITH: May I approach the bench?

5

THE COURT: Sure.

6 I

MR. SMITH: I'm going to refer to Page 1,200, down

7

under Keynote number 2, and basically what this talks about is

8

when an individual, an injured individual recovers PIP benefits

9

from his insured, he should not even plead for those damages,

10

and I read from that case.

11
12

It says, -

THE COURT: Well the PIP benefits, they, they're minor
though.

You're arguing -

13

MR. SMITH: Correct.

14

THE COURT: That, that to me is a minor element of

15
16

this case.
MR. SMITH: Well, it is.

However, we believe that if

17

they, that there's still no right to maintain a claim for

18

general damages unless they meet the threshold requirements of

19

the PIP statute.

20

that it would be unjust and unfair to violate their information

21

on statute.

22

defense at any point in time.

23

individual's right to recover would be.

24

Armstrongs are, that the damages that would be awarded to the

25

Armstrongs are limited by that statute.

That's a statutory provision that exists and

It's not ever, it's not listed as an affirmative
It talks about what an
We think the

15

THE COURT: And your speaking of the threshold?
MR. SMITH: The threshold and the PIP benefits.

The,

the PIP benefits that they received.
THE COURT: And how much is the thresh, how much,
we've got two or three defendants here.

How many defendants -

or plaintiffs, how many plaintiff is the, how many plaintiffs
does the threshold apply to?
MR. SMITH: I think, in this case it will only apply
to Daniel, the father.

That he did not -

THE COURT: Daniel's father?
MR. SMITH: Daniel, the father, the father in this
case.

That the two boys, that this claim, I guess there's a

question on whether or not Taylor has a permanent impairment,
permanent injury, but they both received scarring and under the
threshold requirements a permanent disfigurement is, I guess,
then through the threshold.

For Daniel, the father, however,

he can not establish that he incurred $3,000 in necessary and
reasonable medical expenses as a result of the accident and
that would therefore preclude him from pursuing filing.

It's

the same reason that none of the other Armstrongs that were in
the automobile are here in Court today.
THE COURT: So then you are of the opinion they may
proceed as far as their other MR. SMITH: Correct.
MR. WILDE: What we anticipate is going to happen, is
16

1

we're gonna put on our evidence.

It's gonna show what the

2

damages are.

3

to give us a judgment for each of these three people.

4

disagree with counsel, which is not a surprise, on whether or

5

not there is a permanent injury to, permanent impairment to

6

Daniel Armstrong.

The Court's going to look at those damages, going

However, -

7

THE COURT: Are you alleging there is?

8

MR. WILDE: Excuse me?

9

We allege there is, yes.

However, -

10
11

We

THE COURT: That's a jury, would be a jury question
then.

12

MR. WILDE: That would be a jury question, but that's

13

not a jury question because the pleadings have been stricken.

14

All right?

15

to each of these people, then as Allstate versus Ivy says,

16

they're not entitled to have a double recovery for their PIP

17

benefits.

18

he's obviously's not going to get out a check and write us a

19

check for whatever it is the Court awards up to the policy

20

limits.

21

and Atlantic Casualty is going to be entitled to say, Gee the

22

PIP benefits have already been paid and you're not allowed to

23

claim those PIP benefits and we're going to agree with them and

24

say certainly, that's correct, we're not entitled to those PIP

25

benefits.

Now, when we get through and get a judgment awarded

Now, the good Mr. Pickett obviously is not here and

That check is going to come from Atlantic Casualty,

But that doesn't mean we're not entitled to the
17

damages beyond the PIP benefits and it doesn't mean they're not
entitled, they are entitled to use the no-fault statute as an
affirmative defense because that's exactly what it is, and if
we read the answer to the Complaint, and I haven't read it for
a while, but I will personally guarantee you that one of the
affirmative defenses is the no-fault statute and they're, that
has been stricken.

We're entitled to go ahead, put on evidence

with regards to the damages, let the Court determine what the
damages are and proceed.

If they want to come back on PIP

benefits, they're certainly entitled to do that, at that time.
But it's not a defense here today.
THE COURT: Well, I agree with Mr. Wilde, Mr. Smith.
I think that they can go way beyond PIP benefits and that if a
judgment was awarded to them then of course the PIP benefits
would just be subtracted for the amount of their award that
they claim.

I mean from your client.

MR. SMITH: And we don't believe that if, if the
threshold requirements are not, are not met that they can
proceed on a claim for general damages THE COURT: Well MR. SMITH:

- position and, and to allow them to do

so would create an incentive for anyone in an automobile
accident to file a lawsuit just in case the person defaulted,
whether or not they did or didn't have $3,000 in medical
benefits, whether or not they did or didn't reach the
18

1

threshold.

2

regardless, and that's the purpose that the statute was enacted

3

to prevent.

4

Once the default is entered then they can recover

THE COURT: You may have a point, Mr. Wilde, it is a

5

question for me to decide.

6

whether the father has met the threshold, either the, in the

7

amount of dollars or, or permanent injury.

8
9
10
11

We don't have a jury.

As to

MR. WILDE: I don't think the, I don't think the issue
of the threshold is an issue before the Court.
stricken.

That's been

That's an affirmative defense.
THE COURT: Well, I resolve it right now.

I'm not

12

sure whether that default - my immediate reaction, Mr. Wilde,

13

is you're correct, but that, that, that, when he defaulted

14

those affirmative defenses he has the right to go out the

15

window but then the insurance company's here on a subrogation,

16

that they have the right under that.

17
18

MR. WILDE: And they may have the right to deal with
subrogation -

19

THE COURT: But I would take the position, I'm going

20

to take the position that the affirmative defenses, as far as

21

the statute is concerned, are stricken through his default.

22

course, if you take it up on appeal, then maybe you'll find out

23

I'm wrong.

24

or do you -

25

Now where does that leave us?

Of

Are we ready to go,

MR. WILDE: We're ready to go.
19
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COTTONWOOD HOSPITAL MEDICAL- CENTER

OPERATION REPORT

SURGEON:

JED R. BBJDRUP. M.D.

PREOPERATIVE DIAGNOSIS:

Four facial scars to the left face.

POSTOPERATIVE DIAGNOSIS:

Four facial scars to the left face.

OPERATION:

Revision of four facial scars to the left face. Full
length 5.3 cm.
Anesthesia: General with Dr. Robinson.
INDICATIONS: The patient is a 15 year old male who was involved in a motor
vehicle accident on January 7. 1996. He sustained multiple injuries to his face.
These were allowed to heal without initial primary repair. He now has hypertrophic scars along the jaw line and the left cheek. He now presents for
revision of these scars.
PROCEDURE: After informed consent was obtained from the patient and his parents
he was taken to the operating room where general endotracheal anesthesia was
performed by the anesthesia service. The face region was then prepped with
Betadine and draped in the usual sterile fashion. The four lesions were then
marked and they were infiltrated with .5% Lidocaine with Epinephrine. The
lesions were then all excised in their entirety in a lenticular fashion. They
were passed for specimen. The skin edges were all then approximated using a 6-0
nylon, carefully lining the edges. All wounds were then closed. The areas were
then cleaned, Mastisol applied, followed by steri-strips.
The patient was then awakened in the operating room and was taken to the recovery
room in satisfactory condition.
Again total length of repair was 5 3 cm. Sponge and needle counts were correct.

JED R. BENDRUP. M.D.
JRB/TL431 D: 7-18-96 T: 7-20-96
D O C : FOPARMJ1.JRB Tape: 7021 C: 72005036 77018 3
D I C : JED R. BENDRUP. M.D.
EVD: 7-18-96

OPERATION REPORT
PT. NAME: ARMSTRONG. JERRED
PHYSICIAN: JED R. BENDRUP. M.

MR#:

72005036

n n;v. i ^ ^

ftfffl IHC LABORATORY SERVICES
I H C

A Serrice of Inurmountain Health Care

Elizabeth H. Hammond, M.D.
Chairman, Pathology Dept.
COTTONWOOD HOSPITAL LABORATORY
5770 South 300 East
Murray, UT 84107
(801)269-2730

Name: ARMSTRONG, JARED T
DOB/SEX: 07/25/1980, 15Y M
Pat#:

Case#: SC4731-96
Hosp#: 958971
Acct#: 72005036
Loc : StTRGICAL CENTER
Pathologist: Heinig, Donald W. M.D.
Physician: Bindrup, Jed Reed M.D.
Procedure Date: 7 18 96
Accession Date: 07/18/96

FINAL DIAGNOSIS: SKIN, FACE - SCAR.
CODED DIAGNOSIS: 49060

PRE-OP DIAGNOSIS: FACIAL SCARS
TISSUE: FACIAL SCARS
GROSS:
Received are four ellipses of skin all measuring approximately .7 x .4 cm.
The entire specimen is submitted.
DH:kr
MICRO:
Sections of all of the skin lesions demonstrate epithelium with loss of rete
ridges. There is dense collagen in the dermis. * Some inflammation is also present.
DH:ml
July 19, 1996
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Elizabeth Hammond, M.D. • Donald W. Hcinig, M.D. • Sarah J. Ilstrup, M.D. • Todd L. Randolph, M.D. • Terry H. Rich, M.D. • James P. Seaman, M.D. • Robert L. Yowcll, M.D., Ph.!
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
* * * * *

DANIEL J. ARMSTRONG, JARED
ARMSTRONG, TAYLOR ARMSTRONG BY
LORENE ARMSTRONG, HIS GUARDIAN
AD LITEM,
Plaintiff,

Civil No. 980908711

vs.
GLEN C. PICKETT AND JOHN DOES
1-5,

Judge Homer F. Wilkinson

Defendant.

* * * * *

Telephone Deposition of
JARED TROY ARMSTRONG
October 9, 2000
* * * * *

LILLIAN S. HUNSAKER, CSR
(801) 571-1087

Telephone deposition of JARED TROY ARMSTRONG,
taken on behalf of Plaintiffs, at 935 East South
Union Avenue, Suite D-102, Midvale, Utah,
commencing at 10:10 a.m. on October 9, 2000,
before Lillian S. Hunsaker, Certified Shorthand
Reporter and Notary Public in and for the State of
Utah, pursuant to Notice.
*

*

*

*

*

APPE.ARANC.E.S.
For the Plaintiffs:

ROBERT H. WILDE
Attorney at Law
935 East South Union Avenue
Suite D-102
Midvale, UT 84047

For the Defendants:

Steven B. Smith
SCALLEY & READING
Attorneys at Law
261 East 300 South, Second Floor
Salt Lake City, UT 84111

Also present:

Daniel Jon Armstrong
Lorene Armstrong
L N D. E. X.

Witness:
JARED ARMSTRONG

Page

Examination by Mr. Wilde
Examination by Mr. Smith
Further Examination by Mr. Wilde

4
7
11

EXHIBIT MARKED FOR IDENTIFICATION
Plaintiffs'
1

Page

Copy of photograph; 1 page
*

•

*

*

*

LILLIAN S. HUNSAKER, CSR
(801) 571-1087

5

MIDVALE. UTAH, MONDAY. OCTOBER 9. 2QQQ. 10:10 A.M.,
* * * * *

MR. WILDE:

Hi, Jared.

Bob Wilde.

How are

you?
THE WITNESS:
MR. WILDE:

Fine.
As your dad says, we have got

Steve Smith, who is the attorney for the other side,
along with your mom and dad, and Lillian Hunsaker, who
is the court reporter.
THE WITNESS:
MR. WILDE:

All right.
What we're going to do is put you

under oath, and then I'm going to ask you some
questions, and Mr. Smith will ask you some questions;
I may ask you some more, and so on.
We don't think this is going to take very
long.

But we do need to have you answer in English.
Have you got a copy of that picture that you

took for us?
THE WITNESS:
MR. WILDE:

I do.
Okay.

Why don't you go ahead and

raise your hand, and Lillian is going to swear you in.
JARED ARMSTRONG,
called as a witness at the request of Plaintiffs,
having been first duly sworn, was examined and
testified as follows:

LILLIAN S. HUNSAKER, CSR
(801) 571-1087

3

EXAMINATION
BY MR,

WILDE

Q

Would you tell us what your name and

A

My name is Jared Troy Armstrong; I live at

address

is .

Avenita Cruz De Campo, Building Number 2 1 , 5th Floor,
Room Number A.
Q

What city is that?

A

That's Seville, in the country of Spain.

Q

How long have you been in Spain?

A

I have been in Spain for one year.

Q

How long are you planning on remaining

in

Spain?
A

For another 10 months at least.

Q

Do you recall an automobile accident that you

were involved in?
A

I do.

Q

And you have provided us a copy of a picture

which was recently taken?
A

I did.

Q

Where did that picture get taken?

Tell us

the circumstances under how that picture was taken.
A

I was informed by my father that I needed to

revise some pictures of the scars from the accident.
And I went through a professional photographer who had
LILLIAN S. HUNSAKER, CSR
(801} 571-inft7

a studio here in Seville, Spain, and I asked him to
take some close-up pictures of the scars.

And he took

several pictures; and these are the ones he gave me.
Q

And then you sent those to your father; is

that correct?
A

I did.

Q

Now, as I look at it, it appears that what

we're looking at is your chin and your neck on the
left side; is that correct?
A

That's right.

Q

Okay.

We're going to mark a copy of that

picture here as an exhibit to your deposition.

So

let's take just a minute and let Lillian do that.
(Whereupon, Plaintiffs' Exhibit Number 1
was marked for identification.)
Q

(By Mr. Wilde) All right; we have marked a

copy.
These scars, where did they come from?

What

injuries caused those?
A

I believe they came from my head going

through the side window.
Q

All right.

Did you have scars or injuries to

your face there prior to this accident?
A

I did not.

Q

What was done to make those scars look
LILLIAN S. HUNSAKER, CSR
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better, if anything?
A

Well, we went to the plastic surgeon who--

went in for surgery by him.

I

And, supposedly, he

corrected the scars in the manner that he deemed fit.
Q

And, now, as we look at them, it looks to me

like there's one that's on your left jaw, and another
on your throat, and another that's just slightly above
the one on the bottom of your jaw.

Is that a fair

statement?
A

That's correct.

Q

Are you aware of any other scars or injuries

to you as a result of this accident?
A

Yes.

They are very minor and not visible.

Q

Describe those for us.

A

I have two on my left arm--on my biceps--and

they're in a similar manner and shape and color as
these, but not as visible.
Q

What, if anything, do you recall about that

collision that gave you the scars?
A

Well, I received a concussion, and I do not

remember the collision in any way, shape or form.

I

remember being loaded in the ambulance, and I
remember--slightly before the accident--traveling the
road; but I remember nothing of the accident.
MR. WILDE:

I don't have any more questions.

LILLIAN S. HUNSAKER, CSR
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A

MR. SMITH:

I have a few questions for you,

Jared.
THE WITNESS:

All right.
EXAMINATION

BY MR. SMITH:
Q

Have you done anything to prepare for this

deposition today?
A

I have not.

Q

Other than take photographs?

A

Other than that; no.

Q

How many photographs did you have taken?

A

They took three photographs, but the

photographer only gave me one.
Q

Okay.

And that is the one you sent to your

father?
A

That is right.

Q

Other than these scars on the left side of

your face and neck, did you suffer any other injuries
from this accident?
A

On the left side of my body, I received two

cuts on my biceps — and I also recorded those scars
just n o w — a n d

other than that, just a few bruises and

bumps; and the concussion, as I said.
Q

Okay.

And you recovered from the bruises and

bumps?
LILLIAN S. HUNSAKER, CSR
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1

A

Yes, I did.

2

Q

Did they limit you in any way?

3

A

The bruises and bumps and scars, no, other

4

than....

No, they did not limit me in any way.

5

Q

How do the scars affect you now?

6

A

I just look in the mirror and I see them, and

7

I wish they weren't there.

8

Q

Is that why you had surgery?

9

A

That's why we had surgery.

10

Q

Do you have an opinion about whether or not

11

that surgery helped the scarring?
A

12

I believe it did.

Before, the scars were

13

raised and inflamed.

And I believe it had been almost

14

a year before the surgery was performed o r — a t

15

considerable amount of time--and the scars hadn't

16

subsided at all, and there was swelling and so on.

17

And after surgery, they were fairly flat, and they

18

appear much less prominent.

least a

Q

Do they cause any physical discomfort for

21

A

No, they don't.

22

Q

You just see them and you don't like them?

23

A

Yes.

24

Q

Do they impact shaving at all?

25

A

I did not hear that.

19
20

you?
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Q

Do you have to shave?

A

Yes, I have to shave.

Q

Do they impact how you have to do that?

A

Well, I cut myself, anyway.

But shaving,

they seem to be cut in the amount of times or in the
frequency as the rest of my face.
Q
problem--

So you don't believe they present any
Do they present any other problems to you

other than the fact that you don't like them?
A

No, they do not.

Q

Do you have any other scars on your body from

any other accidents?
A

I do, but they are not related.

Q

What other scars do you have?

A

I have a scar on my forehead from when I was

three or four.

I have a scar on my lower right leg--

an A.T.V. accident--about five years ago.
other scars.

And a few

On my thumb, I have about three.

A bike

accident, on my elbow, about seven years ago.
Q

Other than the surgery to revise the scars by

Dr. Bindrup, have you had any other surgeries?
A

I did.

I had my left hand--I had broke a

bone, metacarpal--the fifth metacarpal--in a fight,
and the doctor pinned the bone in place.
Q

Do you have any scarring from that?
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A

I do not.

Q

Any other hospitalization?

Any other times

you have been to the emergency room?
A

Apart from the other scars that I mentioned

on my lower leg?
Q

Yes.

A

I received stitches for that.

Q

What do you mean?

And recently;

no.
What is your definition of

"recently"?
A

Well, I guess I went to the hospital a month

or two ago for a strained wrist; but other than that,
I haven't been in the hospital for three years--three,
f o u r — w e l l , since the accident, really.
Q

You went to the emergency room after the

accident; is that correct?
A

I did.

Are you referring to that time —

Q

The traffic accident.

A

When the ambulance took us?

Q

Yes.
Do you remember when that happened?

A

When the ambulance took us?

Q

Yes.

A

It was immediately after the accident.

It

was on January 6th, I believe.
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And that was 1996?

It was.
Q

What other treatment have you received

because of injuries you received in the accident?

You

went to Dr. Bindrup for two visits?
A

Yes, I believe so.

Q

Anything else?

A

The emergency room.

And that's it as far as

seeing a physician about it.
Q

Have you ever been involved in any other

lawsuits?
I have not.
MR. SMITH

I think that's all I have

FURTHER

EXAMINATION

BY MR. WILDE;
Q

Jared, this picture that you have, does that

correctly depict the current state of your face?
A

It does.
MR. WILDE:

I don't have any other questions

Jared, I appreciate it.

Your mom and dad

wish they could talk to you more, but they can't.
LORENE ARMSTRONG:
MR. WILDE:

Go back to work.

DAN ARMSTRONG:
THE WITNESS:

We love you.

Work hard.
All right.

Will do.
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MR. WILDE:

Thanks.

(Whereupon, the deposition proceedings were
concluded at 10:35 a.m.)
* * * * *
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WITNESS CERTIFICATE
STATE OF UTAH

)
ss .

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
I, JARED TROY ARMSTRONG, having been duly
sworn, hereby attest and verify:
That I am the witness referred to in the
foregoing deposition and that I have read the foregoing
testimony, making any changes/corrections I deem
necessary, and the same truly and accurately reflects
my testimony.
That any changes/corrections I deem necessary
I have made in ink on the correction sheet attached
hereto as Page 15, giving my reasons therefor and
affixed my initials thereto.

JARED TROY ARMSTRONG
Subscribed and sworn to at Salt Lake County,
Utah, this

day of

2 000.

Notary Public
Residing in
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STATE OF UTAH

)
:
County of Salt Lake )

ss.

I, LILLIAN S. HUNSAKER, C S . R . and Notary
Public for the State of Utah, residing in Salt Lake
County, certify:
That the deposition of JARED TROY ARMSTRONG
was taken telephonically at the time and place herein
set forth, at which time the witness was by me duly
sworn to testify the truth*
That the testimony of the witness and all
objections made and all proceedings had of record at
the time of the examination were reported by me and
were thereafter transcribed into typewriting under my
direction, and I hereby certify that the transcript is
a full, true and correct record of my notes taken.
I further certify that I am not of kin or
otherwise associated with any of the parties herein or
their counsel, and that I am not interested in the
events thereof.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have subscribed my name
and affixed my seal this 10th day of October 2000.

;J:UANSHI,NSA«3*

1 *< •*i^y-y y*'Crmm.*x&*" w !3, 3001

IAN S. HUNSAKER, Certified
Shorthand Reporter and Notary
Public for Salt Lake County,
State of Utah

*P"*
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CORRECTION SHEET
Deposition of JARED TROY ARMSTRONG
Case No. 980908711
Paae-Line

Correction

Taken on: October 9, 2000
Reason

Initials

There are no corrections to be made in transcript.
(Initials)
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